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Abstract. It is well known that certain environmental conditions, such
as a spatially structured population, can promote the evolution of co-
operative traits. However, such conditions are usually assumed to be
externally imposed. In this paper, we present a model that allows the
conditions that promote or hinder cooperation to arise adaptively via
individual selection. Consequently, instead of selection simply favouring
cooperation under imposed environmental conditions, in our model selec-
tion also operates on the conditions themselves via a niche construction
process. Results are presented that show that the conditions that favour
cooperation can evolve, even though those that favour selﬁsh behaviour
are also available and are initially selected for.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the evolution of cooperative behaviour that beneﬁts
all individuals within a group. An example of such behaviour is bacteria growing
at a reduced rate in order to consume a limiting resource more eﬃciently [1–
4]. The diﬃculty in explaining the evolution of such behaviour arises from the
fact that it can be exploited by selﬁsh cheaters who do not pay the costs of
performing the cooperative act themselves but nevertheless still reap the group
beneﬁt. In the bacterial growth example, cheaters would be individuals who
unilaterally grow at a faster rate but in so doing waste resource. If resource is
shared freely between all members of the group, then cheaters will be favoured
under individual selection. This follows since all members of the group feel the
eﬀects of their ineﬃcient resource usage, while only they grow at a faster rate.
However, environmental conditions such as a spatially structured population
can allow prolonged cooperation to be maintained under individual selection [5,
1–3]. As an extreme example, if an individual only shares resource with itself
then selection will clearly favour individuals that consume the limiting resource
with less wastage. A more common situation is that the existence of spatial
structure provides a setting where an individual only shares resource with a
small number of its neighbours. Such a setting allows the formation of clusters of
neighbouring cooperators that share the majority of their resource only with each
other. Consequently, the cooperators in the cluster do not feel the eﬀects of the
wasteful resource usage of cheaters that are located elsewhere in the population,
and so will ultimately reach a larger biomass in the long term [1–3].Unfortunately, such a cluster of cooperators could still be exploited by the
appearance of a mutant cheater amongst their ranks [3]. Therefore, the existence
of spatial structure alone is not suﬃcient to purge cheaters. Indeed, it has al-
ready been proposed in this resource sharing scenario that clusters of cooperators
should periodically break up into single cells in order to prevent them from being
outcompeted by mutant or immigrant cheaters [4]. A somewhat similar approach
that can also purge cheaters is Wilson’s well known trait-group aggregation and
dispersal model [6–8]. This is a model based on the idea that groups containing
a greater proportion of cooperators grow to a larger size than those containing
more cheaters. If the progeny of the groups are then periodically mixed, and
there is suﬃcient diﬀerence in group sizes after growth to counter the decline in
frequency of cooperators within any mixed groups in which they are exploited,
then this can lead to a global increase in the frequency of cooperators. This
outcome can be explained in one of two ways. One view is that selection acting
between groups (diﬀerential group productivity) favours cooperation, while se-
lection within groups favours cheating; the end result is then determined by the
balance of these two selective forces. The alternative, reductionist, view point is
that the cooperative trait can have the greater individual ﬁtness in the context
of a group aggregation and dispersal population structure. Both of these view-
points are compatible with each other, since neither denies that the allele that
increases in frequency globally is the one with the highest ﬁtness when averaged
across the whole population [8].
One of the key determinants of whether the cooperative trait does in fact have
a greater ﬁtness is the variation in ﬁnal group sizes before the groups are remixed,
since this must be suﬃcient to outweigh selection operating within groups that
favours cheaters. This in turn is aﬀected by the variation in group composition
when the groups are formed. For example, it has already been shown that assor-
tative grouping, whereby a propensity exists for individuals to form groups with
other playing the same strategy, facilitates cooperation in cases where random
group formation is insuﬃcient [7,9]. Another way of increasing initial variance in
group composition that is applicable to random group formation is to reduce the
initial group size, thus increasing the sampling error on the global population
due to randomly formed groups.
The above discussion has shown how cooperation can be favoured by certain
environmental conditions or modelling choices. However, in previous works, the
parameter settings that give the cooperative strategy the advantage under in-
dividual selection, e.g. small group size in an aggregation and dispersal model,
have been assumed. As a result, the explanatory power of the models has been
limited to revealing the conditions under which cooperation is favoured. Con-
sequently, they have left unanswered the following question. If individuals can
modify the environmental conditions through individual adaptation such that
either cooperative or selﬁsh behaviour is favoured, which conditions and hence
which behaviour will evolve? Thus, rather than imposing the environmental con-
ditions that favour cooperation, in this paper we allow individual adaptation to
determine whether or not these conditions arise. This modiﬁcation of environ-mental conditions by the evolving individuals is an evolutionary dynamic known
as niche construction [10], and is discussed further in Sect. 4.
In our model, we allow the initial group size parameter of the aggregation and
dispersal process to be brought under individual control. Speciﬁcally, individuals
posses a genotype that carries two parameters. The ﬁrst of these is whether or not
they grow at a reduced rate in order to use a limiting resource more eﬃciently,
i.e. whether they are cooperative or selﬁsh. The second parameter speciﬁes the
size of group that they will join, large or small. Our model also contains an
intrinsic advantage to large groups, in the form of a greater per capita resource
allocation.
It should be noted that individual choice over group size is realistic in many
biological settings. For example, bacteria are known to be able to control micro-
colony size in bioﬁlms via the amount of Extracellular Polymeric Substances
that they secrete and the process of quorum sensing. This example illustrates
the fact that high-level cognitive abilities are not required in order for group size
to be determined adaptively by individuals.
Using our model, we obtain results in which the following pairwise relation-
ships hold: cooperative + large outcompetes cooperative + small, and selﬁsh +
large outcompetes selﬁsh + small. Therefore, evolution should be towards the
large initial group size environmental state. It is then also the case that self-
ish + large outcompetes cooperative + large. This leads to the conclusion that
the direction of evolution should be towards large groups of selﬁsh individuals.
However, when all 4 genotypes are present in the initial population in equal
proportions, this is not what happens. Instead, evolution leads to the ﬁxation
of the cooperative + small genotype. Therefore, although pairwise comparisons
suggest that selﬁsh + large is favoured under individual selection, the dynamics
are such that when all 4 strategies are present it is cooperative + small that
wins. We therefore show in this paper that, given certain parameter settings
and assumptions, individual adaptation of environmental conditions can lead
to those that favour cooperation, even though it initially seems that the oppo-
site environmental conditions and strategy should be promoted under individual
selection.
2 Model Details
Our model consists of a population of individuals that reproduce in randomly
formed groups for a number of generations (t), before the progeny of each group
are mixed together into a migrant pool and the process repeated. The genotype
of each individual speciﬁes two traits:
1. Cooperative or selﬁsh resource usage (speciﬁed as a growth rate, Gi, and a
resource consumption rate Ci);
2. speciﬁcation of the initial size of the group that that the individual will join
(small or large).We therefore consider 4 possible genotypes / strategies: cooperative + small,
cooperative + large, selﬁsh + small and selﬁsh + large.
In our model, reproduction occurs entirely within groups, as follows. Let
ni represent the number of copies of genotype i in a single group. In order
to reproduce, these clones require a share of the group’s resource inﬂux, R.
The amount of resource that a group receives at each time-step depends upon
its size, with a larger per capita amount of resource allocated to larger groups.
Speciﬁcally, a group that is twice as large receives an extra 5% per capita resource
inﬂux. The size of this share that each genotype receives depends upon its growth
and consumption rates relative to those of the other genotype(s), where the
consumption rate should be understood as the amount of resource required for
a genotype to make one copy of itself. The magnitude of the share of the total
group resource that the genotype receives, ri, is then as deﬁned in (1).
ri =
niGiCi P
j
(njGjCj)
R (1)
Therefore, the genotype with the highest growth and consumption rates will
receive the largest per capita share of the total resource. This means that the
selﬁsh genotype always receives more per capita resource than the cooperative
type, and so will ultimately drive a cooperative genotype in the same group
extinct.
Given the share received by a genotype, the number of individuals in the
group with that genotype then changes according to (2). The form of this equa-
tion is motivated as a simpliﬁcation of existing models of bacterial colony growth
[1–3].
ni(t + 1) = ni(t) +
ri
Ci
− Kni(t) (2)
As the replicator equation (2) shows, the number of clones of a genotype
produced during reproduction depends on both growth (favouring the selﬁsh
type in the short-term) and consumption rates (favouring the cooperative type in
the long-term under limited resource). The ﬁnal term in (2) represents mortality,
where K is a death rate that is constant to all genotypes.
The remainder of our model is based around Wilson’s trait-group aggrega-
tion and dispersal process. In order to address our research question, the model
diﬀers from others that use this process in that in our model individuals carry a
gene that determines the initial size of group that they join. Consequently, this
parameter can be set adaptively during evolution. By contrast, in other models
the value of this, and all other parameters of the aggregation and dispersal pro-
cess, are imposed. Thus, in those models the conditions that determine whether
or not cooperative behaviour is selected for are imposed, whereas in our model
they are determined by the individuals themselves.
The other ways in which our model diﬀers from the original trait-group ag-
gregation and dispersal process [6] are that reproduction occurs within groups
and that we impose both global, and group, carrying capacities, where the groupcarrying capacity follows from a ﬁnite resource inﬂux. The overall algorithmic
operation of our model is presented below:
1. Initialisation: Initialise the migrant pool with N individuals.
2. Group formation (aggregation): Assign individuals in the migrant pool
to groups, as described in the main text below.
3. Reproduction: Perform reproduction within groups for t time-steps, as
described in the text above.
4. Migrant pool formation (dispersal): Return the progeny of each group
to the migrant pool.
5. Maintaining the global carrying capacity: Rescale the migrant pool
back to size N, retaining the proportion of individuals with each genotype.
6. Iteration: Repeat from step 2 onwards for a number of generations, T.
Assignment of individuals to groups occurs by the following process. Groups
of the “small” size are created by choosing (without replacement) individuals at
random who specify the small size parameter on their genotype. Likewise, groups
of the “large” size are created from randomly drawn individuals who specify the
large parameter. Therefore, although all individuals in a group will specify the
same size trait, the composition of the group will be random with respect to
the cooperative / selﬁsh resource usage trait. Finally, if there are an insuﬃcient
number of individuals remaining in the migrant pool to form the appropriate
group size, then those remaining unassigned to groups are discarded. Given a
large population size, the eﬀect of this is negligible.
3 Results
In this section, we ﬁrst investigate the results of pairwise competition between
strategies, before proceeding to investigate the dynamics that occur when all 4
strategies are available. Throughout this section, the parameter settings stated
in Table 1 are used.
Table 1. Parameter settings used throughout.
Parameter Value
Growth rate (cooperative), Gc 0.018
Growth rate (selﬁsh), Gs 0.02
Consumption rate (cooperative), Cc 0.1
Consumption rate (selﬁsh), Cs 0.2
Population size, N 4000
Number of generations, T 10001 2 3 4 5 6 7 8+
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Cooperative trait selected for
Fig.1. Equilibrium state as a function of group size and the time spent within groups.
The black area indicates the region of this parameter space where cooperation is
favoured; the white area the region where selﬁsh cheating is favoured.
3.1 Preliminary Experimentation / Pairwise Competition
When deciding on values for “small” and “large” group sizes, it was essential
that the imposition of the small size upon all members of the population lead
to selection favouring the cooperative trait, and the imposition of the large size
lead to selection favouring the selﬁsh trait. This would then give individuals the
possibility of adaptively determining whether the environmental conditions, in
the form of group size, lead to cooperation being selected for.
To determine suitable values for large and small group sizes, the 2D param-
eter space consisting of group size and the time spent in groups prior to mixing
(returning to the migrant pool) was sampled; all other parameters of the model
were held constant. From this sampling, it was possible to plot the parameter
space with respect to whether cooperation was selected for, as shown in Fig. 1.
Note that cooperation is reported as being selected for if and only if the coop-
erative trait reaches ﬁxation in the global population at equilibrium.
As expected, this sample of the space shows that cooperation is favoured by
both small groups and a short time spent within those groups prior to mixing.
Small groups favour cooperation by increasing the variance in group composition,
thereby strengthening selection acting between groups, i.e. selection that is due
to the diﬀerence in group sizes after reproduction [8]. A short time spent in
groups prior to mixing favours cooperation since the longer the time spent in
groups, the greater the decline in frequency of cooperators within all groups that
also contain cheaters [8].
Given the results in Fig. 1, it was decided to set the small group size at 4
and the large at 40, with the time spent within groups ﬁxed at 4. This then
creates the situation in which cooperative + small outcompetes selﬁsh + small,
and selﬁsh + large outcompetes cooperative + large. Therefore, our deﬁnition
of small size favours cooperative eﬃcient resource usage, while our deﬁnition of
large favours selﬁsh ineﬃcient usage.
However, further preliminary results showed that in pairwise competition,
cooperative + small is outcompeted by cooperative + large. This is due to the20 40 60 80 100 120
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Fig.2. Left-hand plot: average environment and strategy through time. Right-hand
plot: change in genotype frequencies over time.
greater per capita resource inﬂux provided to large groups, which allows such
groups to grow to a larger size, assuming all other conditions are the same.
Likewise, selﬁsh + large outcompetes selﬁsh + small. Given that large geno-
types outcompete their small counterparts, and that in an environment with
large groups selﬁsh resource usage is favoured, it should be expected that the
population would evolve towards a state with the selﬁsh + large genotype at
ﬁxation. However, the results in the next section show that this is not the case
if the population is initialised with all 4 genotypes in equal proportion.
3.2 Allowing Both Strategy and Environment to Evolve
The left-hand plot in Fig. 2 shows how the average environmental conditions,
in terms of group size, and the average resource usage strategy, change over
time. The key point is that at the start neither small groups nor cooperators are
favoured; this is shown by an increase in the frequency of both large groups and
selﬁsh cheaters. Therefore, since the initial conditions favour both large groups
and cheaters, it might be expected that the equilibrium reached would consist
entirely of large groups of cheaters. However, this is not what occurs. Instead,
after around 20 generations, both small groups and cooperators become favoured
by selection. Therefore, the selective pressures change in a way that could not
be predicted from pairwise comparisons alone.
The right-hand plot in Fig. 2 can help to explain why this occurs, by showing
how all possible combinations of environment and strategy change over time. The
ﬁgure shows that initially, the environment of large groups is favoured; this is due
to their per capita resource advantage. In such large groups, the selﬁsh ineﬃcient
resource usage strategy is favoured, as previously discussed.
However, the selﬁsh + large genotype does not reach ﬁxation. This is because
selﬁsh cheaters beneﬁt from consuming resource in mixed groups with coopera-
tors, since they can consume the left-over resource that follows from the cooper-
ators eﬃciency. As the selﬁsh + large type increases in frequency, it reduces the
frequency of cooperative + large and hence the number of cooperators that it
can exploit. However, there are still cooperative + small individuals present in
the population. This then creates a selective advantage of being in small groupswhich still contain cooperators that can be exploited, which explains the increase
in frequency of both small types after around 10 generations. Finally, once small
becomes the dominant size allele, the cooperative strategy wins, due to the fact
that cooperators drive selﬁsh cheaters extinct where the initial group size is 4
and t = 4 (as in Sect. 3.1).
4 Discussion
The decision to live in groups of a certain size can be considered as an example
of niche construction. It is commonly held that synergistic ﬁtness eﬀects in a
cooperative, group-living scenario would have been an important driver in the
formation of higher levels of biological organisation [11]. The potential of higher
ﬁtness within groups would have been an incentive for individuals to actively
choose to participate in these groups bringing an aspect of their selective envi-
ronment under control and altering their ﬁtness landscape accordingly. Choosing
to live within a group via some individual-level adaptation or adaptations that
facilitate group formation would thus constitute the creation of a niche. This of
course does not negate the problem of invasion or disruption by selﬁsh individ-
uals. As discussed earlier, in the absence of assortative groupings, cooperation
within a group context is only stable when groups are small enough that between
group variation can be maintained by sampling error, hence allowing between
group selection to be an eﬀective force. We might expect then that cooperative
groups would be stable if the individuals within them were able to adaptively
choose a group size small enough to purge selﬁsh strategies from the population
but large enough to enjoy the ﬁtness beneﬁts of group living.
The signiﬁcance and originality of our model lies in the fact that the con-
ditions that favour cooperation are not assumed. Instead, individuals in the
population carry a speciﬁcation of the conditions, in this case initial group size,
on their genotype. Whether or not conditions that favour cooperation occur is
then determined adaptively by individual selection on this speciﬁcation. Figure
3 illustrates the two-way interaction of strategy and environment in this sce-
nario. On the one hand, whether cooperative or selﬁsh behaviour is preferred
by individual adaptation is inﬂuenced by the environment - this is normal, envi-
ronmentally sensitive, adaptation. On the other, whether individual adaptation
will support the construction of environments with large groups or small groups
is inﬂuenced by the strategy being played - this is niche construction. A system
with these two inﬂuences must reach an attractor where the characteristics of
the environment favour strategies that in turn support those particular environ-
mental characteristics. In this case we need not presuppose, for example, that
the prevailing environment favours cooperation in order for cooperation to arise;
and similarly, we need not presuppose that the prevailing strategy is cooperative
in order for cooperation-favouring groups to arise.
Previous models have shown that cooperative traits are selected for when en-
vironmental conditions favour cooperation. In our model, conditions that favour
either selﬁsh or cooperative traits are available. We have then been able to showFig.3. Feedback between strategy and environment and their adaptation.
that, under given parameter settings and model assumptions, the conditions
that promote cooperation (a small group size) are indeed selected for. This also
occurs despite a bias towards the conditions (large groups) that favour selﬁsh
individuals. The result that the cooperative + small genotype reaches ﬁxation,
even though cooperative + large beats it in pairwise competition, is particularly
interesting since a small group size can therefore be viewed as an adaptation that
purges cheaters. The adaptive dynamics of the model can be seen more clearly
in Fig. 2, which shows the changing global proportions of individuals choosing
a large group environment and those choosing a selﬁsh strategy over the course
of the run. It is clear that both large group size and selﬁsh resource use are
initially favoured, however the frequency of the large group adaptation quickly
peaks and starts to decline. In our scenario this occurs because a) in the presence
of many large-group preferring cheaters, cooperators change their preference to
favour small groups not large and the large-group cheaters become less and less
ﬁt; and, b) in the presence of many small cooperators, cheaters (also) change
their preference to favour small groups not large. Once small groups are estab-
lished, cooperation is the more ﬁt strategy. This minimalist model illustrates the
tightly coupled interaction of the evolution of strategy with the evolution of an
individual’s environment-aﬀecting characters.
5 Conclusion
A plethora of models have shown that certain environmental conditions, such as
a spatially structured population, can promote cooperative behaviour. This oc-
curs because such conditions can give a cooperative trait a higher ﬁtness than the
selﬁsh trait, when averaged over the whole population. Our contention however
is that individuals are not simply the passive recipients of environmental con-
ditions. Niche construction dynamics in which organisms adaptively alter their
environments and thus their ﬁtness landscapes have been observed in many sys-
tems and are postulated to be an important evolutionary dynamic [10]. It seems
reasonable that individuals could adaptively choose to form or dissolve groups
thus choosing the conditions that would facilitate either cooperative or selﬁsh
behaviour to be the preferred strategy. However, previous models have not con-
sidered the eﬀect of allowing individual adaptation to determine whether or not
these favourable conditions arise.In this paper, we have considered cooperation in the consumption of a limit-
ing resource, where our cooperative strategy consumes resource more eﬃciently
but suﬀers a cost of a reduced growth rate. This cost means that cooperators can
be exploited by selﬁsh individuals who consume resource less eﬃciently but that
grow at a faster rate. However, it is already well known that Wilson’s trait-group
aggregation and dispersal model can potentially purge cheaters in situations such
as this. One important parameter of the aggregation and dispersal process that
determines whether or not cooperation wins out is the initial group size. Rather
than impose this externally, as in previous models, we allow it to be set adap-
tively via individual selection in a process analogous to niche construction. In
this minimal model we have demonstrated that when both cooperative and self-
ish strategies and the environmental conditions, the group size, which favours
each, are both adaptable, then both cooperative behaviour and the small group
size environment which actively supports it can evolve via individual selection
even in conditions which initially favour large groups and selﬁsh cheaters.
In future work, we may consider the introduction of new strategies via mu-
tation. We also intend to examine in more detail the parameter values that
promote cooperation and small groups, with regard to determining how large an
attractor this equilibrium is. Finally, the process of niche construction should
also be applicable to other parameters of the aggregation and dispersal process,
for example, to the time spent reproducing in groups before mixing in the mi-
grant pool. It would therefore be useful to investigate the individual adaptation
of this and other parameters.
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